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Trump's fraud case got nudged to the higher court because of a disagreement over the millions in fines, not the fraud
...essentially, four of the five judges agreed that the fraud judgement was proper, agreed that the civil remedies restricting the business were properly decided, and rejected the Trump claims about statute of limitations, right to bring charges, and the rest; while one judge thought the statute of limitations argument was enough to throw the whole thing out.
Even though the four agreed with the fraud judgement, all four disagreed in some part with the 'fine' or disgorgement calculated by Attorney General James' attorneys.
They all said it violated laws against excessive fines, but two of them thought it should be adjusted by them, and the other two thought a new trial might need to be held on certain individual counts to determine the amount, or whether a fine was appropriate at all.
So, instead of just letting the disagreement stand, and to give the plaintiff the opportunity to advance the case to the higher court, the two pairs of opinions joined together to send the case up the ladder.
"Because none of the three decisions garners a majority, Justices Higgitt and Rosado join Renwick, and Moulton, in this decision for the sole purpose of ensuring finality, thereby affording the parties a path for appeal to the Court of Appeals."
...they state all of this very clearly in the ruling:
5 MOULTON, J. (concurring) Defendants appeal from two decisions (and the resulting judgment) holding that defendants violated Executive Law § 63(12) by repeatedly submitting deceptive business records to banks, insurance companies, and the New York City Parks Department. Presiding Justice Renwick and I find that Supreme Court correctly found defendants liable.
We agree with Supreme Court that the Attorney General acted well within her lawful power in bringing this action, and that she vindicated a public interest in doing so. We also find that Supreme Court properly ruled only on claims that are timely under the applicable statute of limitations.
However, we would modify the remedy ordered by Supreme Court. While the injunctive relief ordered by the court is well crafted to curb defendants’ business culture, the court’s disgorgement order, which directs that defendants pay nearly half a billion dollars to the State of New York, is an excessive fine that violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
This decision is one of three issued by this Court today. Presiding Justice Renwick and I agree with our colleagues on certain points. Most importantly, we agree with Justice Higgitt, who is joined by Justice Rosado, that the Attorney General is empowered by Executive Law § 63(12) to bring this action. However, our remaining disagreements with our colleagues’ decisions are profound.
In sum, Justice Friedman finds that Supreme Court’s rulings are infirm in almost every respect and would hold that the Attorney General had no power to bring this case under Executive Law § 63(12). He would dismiss the complaint outright.
Justice Higgitt, while agreeing that the Attorney General had the power to bring this lawsuit, finds that errors made by Supreme Court require a new trial limited to only some of the transactions in question.
Respectfully, Presiding Justice Renwick and I cannot harmonize our approach with that of our colleagues. Justice Friedman’s decision runs athwart our prior rulings in this case and misconstrues Executive Law § 63(12) and the case law that has interpreted that statute. While he justly criticizes comments made by the Attorney General about defendants when she was running for that office, he ignores that this issue has already been considered, and rejected, by this Court. Justice Higgitt’s decision contains cogent criticisms of aspects of Supreme Court’s two written decisions.
However, this Court has the power to independently analyze the record made below in evaluating those decisions. That record amply justifies Supreme Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Returning this action to Supreme Court for a new trial as urged by Justice Higgitt is both unnecessary and likely terminal. It is difficult to imagine that a trial could proceed while one of the principal defendants, and a central witness, is President of the United States.
The inevitable elapse of time and the attendant difficulties in recreating a vast record of testimony and documents – an exercise that is both Sisyphean and unneeded, because an extensive trial record already exists – would likely consign this meritorious case to oblivion. Because none of the three decisions garners a majority, Justices Higgitt and Rosado join the decretal of this decision for the sole purpose of ensuring finality, thereby affording the parties a path for appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Like Justice Friedman, we commend them for doing so. Unlike Justice Friedman, we do not find that this necessary measure is unfair to defendants. This Court previously imposed a stay on the judgment, a stay that defendants can seek to extend pursuant to CPLR 5519(e) until the Court of Appeals rules.
...here's where they discuss the four judges' disagreement with the one calling for aquittal on the fraudulent property valuations:
Defendants and Justice Friedman contend that Supreme Court erred in awarding the Attorney General partial summary judgment because it made valuation errors, specifically pointing to the court’s valuations for Mar-a-Lago.
In Justice Friedman’s view, the court made a “glaring error” by relying on Palm Beach County’s assessed value for property taxes, which considered the restrictive use of the property and valued it in the range of $18 million to $27.6 million. Justice Friedman additionally cites evidence in “recent years” demonstrating that Mar-a-Lago generated more than $50 million in annual revenue. We disagree.
To determine whether defendants violated the statute, the relevant inquiry is whether the estimated current values were fraudulently inflated by amounts that were material to the user. To that end, Supreme Court compared defendants’ valuations for Mar-a-Lago with Palm Beach County’s assessed value for property taxes, 86 which is one method that the preparer may use to calculate the estimated current values (see ASC 274-10.55-6e). Defendants’ valuations for Mar-a-Lago ranged between $347 million to $739 million for the periods 2014 through 2021 and did not consider the property’s restrictive use. Palm Beach County’s valuations ranged between $18 million to $27.6 million and considered the property’s restrictive use as a private club, not a private residence.
The fact that a property’s assessed value does not necessarily equate to market value is irrelevant to Supreme Court’s determination that the estimated current values for Mar-a-Lago were materially inflated. Justice Friedman is skeptical that President Trump would have agreed to restrictions which would so negatively impact the property’s value. However, it was the Trump Organization that believed that Mar-a-Lago was too expensive for one individual to own and maintain, and therefore, rationally proposed the restrictive use in their Use and Preservation Plan report.
Moreover, defendants did not disagree with the County’s valuations. For the 2020 tax assessment, defendants’ representative filed an appeal of the County’s tax valuation, but later withdrew the appeal checking a box indicating “the petitioner agrees with the determination of the property appraiser or tax collector.”
Supreme Court properly concluded that defendants’ valuations for Mar-a- Lago were substantially inflated based on the substantial discrepancy between the County’s tax valuation and defendants’ valuations. Justice Friedman mischaracterizes my argument when he states that I fail to explain “why the restrictions would push the property’s market value from multiple hundreds of millions of dollars all the way down to the $18-$27 million range.”
Neither the Attorney General, nor Supreme Court, ever valued Mar-a-Lago at precisely $18 million at the low end or $27 million at the high end. Rather, the record demonstrates that Mar-a-Lago’s valuations were fraudulently 87 inflated by material amounts based on the substantial discrepancy between the County’s tax valuation (valuations to which defendants agreed) and defendants’ valuations, which failed to account for the property’s restrictions.
Justice Friedman’s reliance on evidence that Mar-a-Lago generated more than $50 million annually in recent years is misplaced. This evidence is based on a Posttrial Newsweek article submitted by defendants on appeal. Even if it were proper to consider a posttrial article, the result would be the same.
The article described Mar-a-Lago as generating $52.3 million in 2023 and $56.9 million in 2024, which is still a substantial discrepancy from defendants’ valuations of $347 million to $739 million. Consequently, the court correctly found that the estimated current values for Mar-a- Lago were fraudulently inflated by material amounts, considering the property use restrictions.
Contrary to Justice Friedman’s observation, that President Trump resides at Mar-a-Lago most of the time when he is not at the White House is of no import. As the result of neighbor complaints, the Palm Beach County attorney prepared a 2021 memorandum to the Mayor and Town Council. The attorney concluded that the Use Agreement and the Palm Beach Zoning Code did not prohibit President Trump from residing at Mar-a-Lago as a “bona fide employee” of the Club. The town took no further action against President Trump.
Whether President Trump can continue to reside at Mar-a-Lago as a “bona fide employee” of the Club under the Palm Beach Zoning Code has no bearing on how the Trump Organization valued the sale of Mar-a-Lago to another individual. According to defendants, like President Trump, any new owner could use Mar-a- Lago as an “exclusive private residence.”
Defendants do not define the term “exclusive” 88 but they point out that the Use Agreement allows Club use to be “intentionally abandoned at any time” and, if that occurs “the use of the Land shall revert to a single family residence and the ownership of the Owner.”
Thus, defendants appear to argue that they can, as their expert Lawrence Moens assumed, “close the club and utilize the property as a single-family residence.” However, President Trump gave up his reversionary interest under the Use Agreement by executing Deed of Development Rights – if he did not do so earlier under the Deed of Conservation and Preservation.
The property is therefore burdened by restrictions to continue the Club usage as well as undertaking expensive preservation efforts. In any event, regardless of what defendants intended when they referred to the ability to sell the property as an “exclusive private residence,” the estimated current values were fraudulently inflated because the property was misleadingly valued on a per-acre basis, for the reasons previously discussed.
read more from the court document: https://nycourts.gov/courts/AD1/calendar/AppsMots/2025/apps/20250821/2023-04925,%20et%20ano..pdf
We agree with Supreme Court that the Attorney General acted well within her lawful power in bringing this action, and that she vindicated a public interest in doing so. We also find that Supreme Court properly ruled only on claims that are timely under the applicable statute of limitations.
However, we would modify the remedy ordered by Supreme Court. While the injunctive relief ordered by the court is well crafted to curb defendants’ business culture, the court’s disgorgement order, which directs that defendants pay nearly half a billion dollars to the State of New York, is an excessive fine that violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
This decision is one of three issued by this Court today. Presiding Justice Renwick and I agree with our colleagues on certain points. Most importantly, we agree with Justice Higgitt, who is joined by Justice Rosado, that the Attorney General is empowered by Executive Law § 63(12) to bring this action. However, our remaining disagreements with our colleagues’ decisions are profound.
In sum, Justice Friedman finds that Supreme Court’s rulings are infirm in almost every respect and would hold that the Attorney General had no power to bring this case under Executive Law § 63(12). He would dismiss the complaint outright.
Justice Higgitt, while agreeing that the Attorney General had the power to bring this lawsuit, finds that errors made by Supreme Court require a new trial limited to only some of the transactions in question.
Respectfully, Presiding Justice Renwick and I cannot harmonize our approach with that of our colleagues. Justice Friedman’s decision runs athwart our prior rulings in this case and misconstrues Executive Law § 63(12) and the case law that has interpreted that statute. While he justly criticizes comments made by the Attorney General about defendants when she was running for that office, he ignores that this issue has already been considered, and rejected, by this Court. Justice Higgitt’s decision contains cogent criticisms of aspects of Supreme Court’s two written decisions.
However, this Court has the power to independently analyze the record made below in evaluating those decisions. That record amply justifies Supreme Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Returning this action to Supreme Court for a new trial as urged by Justice Higgitt is both unnecessary and likely terminal. It is difficult to imagine that a trial could proceed while one of the principal defendants, and a central witness, is President of the United States.
The inevitable elapse of time and the attendant difficulties in recreating a vast record of testimony and documents – an exercise that is both Sisyphean and unneeded, because an extensive trial record already exists – would likely consign this meritorious case to oblivion. Because none of the three decisions garners a majority, Justices Higgitt and Rosado join the decretal of this decision for the sole purpose of ensuring finality, thereby affording the parties a path for appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Like Justice Friedman, we commend them for doing so. Unlike Justice Friedman, we do not find that this necessary measure is unfair to defendants. This Court previously imposed a stay on the judgment, a stay that defendants can seek to extend pursuant to CPLR 5519(e) until the Court of Appeals rules.
...here's where they discuss the four judges' disagreement with the one calling for aquittal on the fraudulent property valuations:
Defendants and Justice Friedman contend that Supreme Court erred in awarding the Attorney General partial summary judgment because it made valuation errors, specifically pointing to the court’s valuations for Mar-a-Lago.
In Justice Friedman’s view, the court made a “glaring error” by relying on Palm Beach County’s assessed value for property taxes, which considered the restrictive use of the property and valued it in the range of $18 million to $27.6 million. Justice Friedman additionally cites evidence in “recent years” demonstrating that Mar-a-Lago generated more than $50 million in annual revenue. We disagree.
To determine whether defendants violated the statute, the relevant inquiry is whether the estimated current values were fraudulently inflated by amounts that were material to the user. To that end, Supreme Court compared defendants’ valuations for Mar-a-Lago with Palm Beach County’s assessed value for property taxes, 86 which is one method that the preparer may use to calculate the estimated current values (see ASC 274-10.55-6e). Defendants’ valuations for Mar-a-Lago ranged between $347 million to $739 million for the periods 2014 through 2021 and did not consider the property’s restrictive use. Palm Beach County’s valuations ranged between $18 million to $27.6 million and considered the property’s restrictive use as a private club, not a private residence.
The fact that a property’s assessed value does not necessarily equate to market value is irrelevant to Supreme Court’s determination that the estimated current values for Mar-a-Lago were materially inflated. Justice Friedman is skeptical that President Trump would have agreed to restrictions which would so negatively impact the property’s value. However, it was the Trump Organization that believed that Mar-a-Lago was too expensive for one individual to own and maintain, and therefore, rationally proposed the restrictive use in their Use and Preservation Plan report.
Moreover, defendants did not disagree with the County’s valuations. For the 2020 tax assessment, defendants’ representative filed an appeal of the County’s tax valuation, but later withdrew the appeal checking a box indicating “the petitioner agrees with the determination of the property appraiser or tax collector.”
Supreme Court properly concluded that defendants’ valuations for Mar-a- Lago were substantially inflated based on the substantial discrepancy between the County’s tax valuation and defendants’ valuations. Justice Friedman mischaracterizes my argument when he states that I fail to explain “why the restrictions would push the property’s market value from multiple hundreds of millions of dollars all the way down to the $18-$27 million range.”
Neither the Attorney General, nor Supreme Court, ever valued Mar-a-Lago at precisely $18 million at the low end or $27 million at the high end. Rather, the record demonstrates that Mar-a-Lago’s valuations were fraudulently 87 inflated by material amounts based on the substantial discrepancy between the County’s tax valuation (valuations to which defendants agreed) and defendants’ valuations, which failed to account for the property’s restrictions.
Justice Friedman’s reliance on evidence that Mar-a-Lago generated more than $50 million annually in recent years is misplaced. This evidence is based on a Posttrial Newsweek article submitted by defendants on appeal. Even if it were proper to consider a posttrial article, the result would be the same.
The article described Mar-a-Lago as generating $52.3 million in 2023 and $56.9 million in 2024, which is still a substantial discrepancy from defendants’ valuations of $347 million to $739 million. Consequently, the court correctly found that the estimated current values for Mar-a- Lago were fraudulently inflated by material amounts, considering the property use restrictions.
Contrary to Justice Friedman’s observation, that President Trump resides at Mar-a-Lago most of the time when he is not at the White House is of no import. As the result of neighbor complaints, the Palm Beach County attorney prepared a 2021 memorandum to the Mayor and Town Council. The attorney concluded that the Use Agreement and the Palm Beach Zoning Code did not prohibit President Trump from residing at Mar-a-Lago as a “bona fide employee” of the Club. The town took no further action against President Trump.
Whether President Trump can continue to reside at Mar-a-Lago as a “bona fide employee” of the Club under the Palm Beach Zoning Code has no bearing on how the Trump Organization valued the sale of Mar-a-Lago to another individual. According to defendants, like President Trump, any new owner could use Mar-a- Lago as an “exclusive private residence.”
Defendants do not define the term “exclusive” 88 but they point out that the Use Agreement allows Club use to be “intentionally abandoned at any time” and, if that occurs “the use of the Land shall revert to a single family residence and the ownership of the Owner.”
Thus, defendants appear to argue that they can, as their expert Lawrence Moens assumed, “close the club and utilize the property as a single-family residence.” However, President Trump gave up his reversionary interest under the Use Agreement by executing Deed of Development Rights – if he did not do so earlier under the Deed of Conservation and Preservation.
The property is therefore burdened by restrictions to continue the Club usage as well as undertaking expensive preservation efforts. In any event, regardless of what defendants intended when they referred to the ability to sell the property as an “exclusive private residence,” the estimated current values were fraudulently inflated because the property was misleadingly valued on a per-acre basis, for the reasons previously discussed.
read more from the court document: https://nycourts.gov/courts/AD1/calendar/AppsMots/2025/apps/20250821/2023-04925,%20et%20ano..pdf
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